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In the Court’s opinion, except in emergency cases, the individual concerned should not be 
deprived of his liberty unless he has been reliably shown to be of "unsound mind". The very 
nature of what has to be established before the competent national authority - that is, a 
true mental disorder - calls for objective medical expertise. Further, the mental disorder 
must be of a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement. What is more, the 
validity of continued confinement depends upon the persistence of such a disorder.   
 
Winterwerp v the Netherlands, Application no. 6301/73,  
judgment of 24 October 1979, para 39, emphasis added. 
 
Introduction:  Re-Thinking the Need for Regulation of Detention 
 
These comments by the ECtHR are well known.  While there has been considerable litigation 
in Strasbourg as to the required procedures for detention of ‘persons of unsound mind’ under Article 
5(1)(e) of the ECHR,1 there has been much less discussion of the substance:  what, precisely, is a 
mental disorder ‘warranting compulsory confinement’?  Certainly, the court has held that people 
may be detained when they require treatment for their mental disorder, or when they are 
dangerous because of their mental disorder may be detained even if they are not treatable,2 but this 
is a long way from providing a convincing substantive standard for civil psychiatric detention.   
 
It is of course a fair question how far it is for Council of Europe institutions such as the ECtHR 
and the CPT to prescribe standards for individual states.  Just as individual states have a considerable 
margin of appreciation in how they phrase their criminal laws, they equally have an appropriate 
freedom in the establishment of their mental health laws, so long as the results comply with the 
ECHR.  The appropriate role of the Council of Europe institutions is not necessarily to prescribe 
appropriate standards, but to see that appropriate standards are prescribed. 
 
Too often, it is the case in CoE countries that this process of clear prescription does not 
happen.  Instead, detention becomes a matter of discretion on the part of clinicians and/or social 
services personnel, with courts, where they are required to approve detentions, becoming little 
                                                          
1
 For a discussion of these cases, see P Bartlett, O Lewis and O Thorold, Mental Disability and the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), particularly chapter 2. 
2
 See, eg., Hutchison Reid v the United Kingdom, Application no. 50272/99, judgment of 20 May 2003, (2003) 
37 EHRR 9.  
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more than a rubber stamping exercise.  The criminal law parallel would be a statute allowing 
imprisonment for severe naughtiness, with it being left to the police to determine what constitutes 
naughtiness, when it is sufficiently severe, and how long the individual will spend in prison.  While 
there can be no doubt of the good faith of the considerable bulk of mental health and social service 
professionals (or, in the criminal law parallel, the considerable bulk of police officers), a belief in the 
rule of law makes this situation unacceptable.  Insofar as jurisprudential support is required for that 
proposition, it is to be found in Sunday Times v the United Kingdom, which requires sufficient 
legislative precision that the citizen may, with legal advice if necessary, reasonably foresee the 
consequences of his or her actions.3  While foreseeability by the subject is certainly relevant in the 
context of mental health detentions, the standard is at least as important because of its governance 
of practitioners:  a clear standard is required to ensure that different practitioners will respond to 
similar cases in similar ways.  It is also necessary if procedural protections such as court hearings are 
going to have any meaning:  if a judge is to satisfy himself or herself that statutory criteria are met, 
he or she must be clear what those criteria are, and what evidence is necessary to demonstrate that 
they have been met.  Absent such clarity, detention becomes a lottery.   
 
The failure of States Party to establish and enforce meaningful criteria for detention 
suggests that a more robust approach from Strasbourg may be necessary.  While the sovereignty of 
States Party must of course be maintained, meaningful guidance does need to be provided to 
governments and courts as to what constitutes appropriate substantive standards.  Certainly, as the 
ECHR jurisprudence acknowledges, drafting can never cover all eventualities; but the impossibility of 
perfection should not be used to avoid insistence on a vast improvement in statutory criteria and 
their implementation. 
 
The issue clearly has relevance for the ECtHR, but it may also be of relevance to the CPT for 
at least two reasons.  First, the experience of people detained in psychiatric contexts moves 
considerably beyond the deprivation of liberty.  The individual is likely to be subjected for example 
to non-consensual psychiatric treatment, from highly intrusive chemical treatments sometimes to 
electro-convulsive therapy.  Less discussed in the legal literature is the fact that individuals may be 
deprived of educational possibilities and social environments that allow for personal development.  
When individuals are in these environments for a long period of time, their development of self is 
substantially stunted, often with permanent effects.  The long-term institutionalisation of people 
with intellectual disabilities in much of central Europe, often commencing at a very young age, is a 
particularly clear example of this latter phenomenon.  Further, the disempowerment experienced in 
psychiatric and similar detentions, and the stigma (including self-stigma) that flows therefrom, is 
often experienced by people detained as exceptionally violative.  These are not simply questions of 
detention.  When bodily integrity is violated by intrusive medical treatments, when a person’s 
environment is sufficiently restricted that personal development is effected, or when a person 
inappropriately experiences the psychological effects of systematic disempowerment, issues under 
Article 3 must also arise.  While these issues are of concern for anyone admitted to institutions 
because of mental disabilities, the situation of people who do not meet appropriate admission 
criteria (either because they do not meet the criteria on admission, or because they no longer do so) 
is particularly poignant:  ex hypothesi they should not be in the institution; therefore the effects of 
institutionalisation raise particular questions under Article 3.  This is consistent with the line of case 
law that finds the use of force beyond that strictly necessary constitutes a violation of Article 3.4  It is 
                                                          
3
 Sunday Times v the United Kingdom, Application no. 6538/74, judgment 26 April 1979,  (1979) 2 EHRR 245, 
para 49. 
4
 See, eg., Mouisel v France, Application no. 67263/01, judgment 14 November 2002, para 48; Yankov v 
Bulgaria, Application no. 39084/97, judgment 11 December 2003, para 120; Valasinas v Lithuania, Application 
no 44558/98, judgment 24 July 2011, para 117;  Van der Ven v the Netherlands, Application no 50901/99, 
judgment 4 February 2003, para 62. 
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difficult to see how the forces described, when exerted on an individual who should not be in an 
institution, can be other than not strictly necessary. 
 
Second, the CPT is unique in Council of Europe institutions in that it performs site visits and 
inspections.  The CPT, more than any other CoE body, can see how law is implemented in something 
close to a systematic way, in the facilities it visits.  Considerable judicial notice has been taken in the 
ECtHR of the vulnerability of people in psychiatric hospitals and similar environments,5 a set of 
concerns appropriately reflected in the CPT’s visits to psychiatric hospitals, social care homes and 
similar institutions.  This is not necessarily a population that can be expected to press vociferously 
for its rights.  If meaningful standards are to be implemented in practice, then, it must be 
organisations such as the CPT that ensure that the standards are created and complied with. 
 
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), which 
came into effect in 2008, creates a new set of complications.  Unlike other international instruments 
relating to mental disability, the CRPD reads in many ways like a standard human rights treaty.  
Previous international instruments had started from the premise that compulsion based on mental 
disability (be it detention or compulsory treatment) was justified in at least some circumstances; the 
issue was articulating and clarifying that permitted area of compulsion.  Typically, the justification 
for such intervention was assumed, or at least not expressly articulated.6  The CRPD, by comparison, 
takes as a starting point that compulsion is not justifiable on the basis of disability. 
 
Article 14(1) of the CRPD provides an example of particular relevance here: 
 
1. States Parties shall ensure that persons with disabilities, on an equal basis with others: 
 
(a) Enjoy the right to liberty and security of person; 
 
(b) Are not deprived of their liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily, and that any deprivation of 
liberty is in conformity with the law, and that the existence of a disability shall in no case 
justify a deprivation of liberty. [emphasis added] 
 
It is still early days for the CRPD, and there may be some room for debate as to the meaning of this 
provision.  Early indications are that what is expected however is an uncoupling of detention from 
disability.   Certainly, the existence of a disability per se will not be sufficient to justify detention 
under the CRPD.7  This last point is entirely consistent with the ECHR jurisprudence, which as noted 
above requires that a mental disability be of a nature or degree warranting confinement.  Even this 
limited reading of the CRPD (and ECHR) requirements remains relevant, however:  it would seem 
that insofar as courts in many countries offer oversight of admission at all, their scrutiny does not 
seem to extend much beyond whether the individual has a mental disability.  Even on a minimalist 
reading of the CRPD, and even on the ECHR jurisprudence as it had developed before the CRPD, this 
is not acceptable.   
 
                                                          
5
 See, eg., Herczegfalvy v Austria, Application no. 10533/83, judgment 24 September 1992, para 82; Keenan v 
the United Kingdom, Application no 27229/95, judgment 3 April 2001, para 111. 
6
 For a clear example of this approach, see CoE Rec(2004)10, in particular recommendations 17 and 18 
regarding compulsory admission and treatment of persons with mental disorder.   
7
 This may, perhaps, be consistent with the report of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
regarding Tunisia:  see Concluding Observations on Tunisia, CRPD/C/TUN/CO/1, 13 May 2011, para 24-5, but it 
is difficult to know since the legal facts are not clear on the face of the report.  The Tunisian report is as yet the 
only national report of the Committee, so it is difficult as yet to say with precision how its thinking is 
developing on the issue. 
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Initial indications are however that the interpretation of Article 14 will go considerably 
further, holding not simply that disability cannot be the sole reason for detention, but instead that 
disability may not form any part of the justification for detention.8   The precise scope of this view 
remains as yet unclear.  One view could be that the provision means what it says:  disability cannot 
be used as a factor in detention, and in the same way that we do not engage in preventive detention 
for other people, we may not do so for people with disabilities.  This view warrants more than 
passing consideration.  The CRPD emphasises the social model of disability – the view that the 
limiting factors of disability flow from society’s failure adequately to accommodate difference, 
rather than factors intrinsic to the disabled person himself or herself.  Insofar as this model is 
convincing, it is not obvious why compulsion of people with disabilities is required, once society 
adapts itself to the diversity within it.  If appropriate services and supports are provided, the 
argument goes, compulsion will be no more necessary for people with mental disabilities than 
anyone else.  There is much to recommend this view in many circumstances, including those related 
to psychiatric and related detention.  Thus in much of Europe, provision of proper community 
housing and community support would provide an option likely to be preferred by many people with 
mental disability.  If services are provided that people want, it will not be necessary to force them to 
use them.  For a large number of people in psychiatric and related institutions, this is almost 
certainly a convincing argument.  And if the state refuses to offer services that people do want to 
use, it is ethically dubious to force them to use services they do not want to use. 
 
This approach is convincing to the extent that the social model is convincing, and many 
people will find it not entirely convincing.  While it seems highly likely that it applies for many people 
and many situations, it is certainly arguable that, at least with the array of interventions and support 
mechanisms available even in the wealthiest and most progressive countries, there is a kernel at the 
core of mental disability that means the social model is not wholly adequate.  In this view for some 
people, in some situations, disability is not just about society’s failure to adapt, and the impairment 
at the core of the mental disability is relevant to policymaking in some (albeit generally much 
restricted) circumstances. 
 
Even if this is accepted, it does not follow that compulsory measures are easily justified.  It 
would appear that even in countries with relatively developed health care systems, a minority of 
people who are detained are grateful for the detention afterwards.  In Priebe’s study of service user 
views a year after hospitalisation in England, only 40 percent of the 396 patients interviewed 
thought their involuntary admission justified.9  This is broadly consistent with the smaller study by 
Gardiner and Lidz of retrospective approval of admissions in America, where roughly half of the 65 
patients who did not think their detention justified when it occurred changed their view over time, 
but Gardner and Lidz note that even those who retrospectively viewed their detention as justified 
did not change in the way they felt about the admission:  those that were angry at the time of 
admission were still angry.  Even those that viewed their detentions as justified were still not 
grateful.  Gardiner and Lidz view this as flowing from the feeling of injury consequent on the 
                                                          
8
 See, eg., Annual report of the High Commissioner for HumanRights to the General Assembly.  A/HRC/10/49, 
presented 26 January 2009, para 48-9.  See also UN, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
‘Persons with Disabilities’ Dignity and Justice for Detainees Week, Information Note No. 4, (2008) p. 2.  
Available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/60UDHR/detention_infonote_4.pdf.  Accessed 26 
July 09.   
9
 S Priebe et al, ‘Patients’ views and readmissions 1 year after involuntary hospitalisation’ (2009) 194 British 
Medical Journal 49.  The authors consider that this may in fact be higher than the actual number, as roughly 
half of their original sample dropped out prior to the interview at the one year period. 
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coercive elements of the detention, and the consequent loss of autonomy.10  Consistent with this, 
Katsakou finds treatment satisfaction among those subject to enforced treatment lower than for 
those not coerced.11  I am not aware of follow-up work done on the patient careers of those who 
were not grateful after their period of incarceration, but it seems likely given the lower treatment 
satisfaction that their negative experience will have undermined rather than buttressed the doctor-
patient relationship, suggesting that these people will be more hesitant to engage with services in 
the future.  Quite apart from human rights concerns, coercion does have down sides, and these are 
not necessarily considered in policy-making in this area. 
 
The literature surrounding the detention provisions of Article 14 of the CRPD has at least 
two caveats warranting consideration.  First, it has been argued that while disability is a prohibited 
criterion, this does not preclude specific characteristics related to the disability from being criteria.  
Thus while for example schizophrenia could not be a criterion, the inability to control impulse could 
be.12  Second, and perhaps closely related, the view of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
is that notwithstanding the prohibition on the use of disability as a criterion for detention, people 
with disabilities can nonetheless be subject to preventive detention, but ‘the legal grounds upon 
which restriction of liberty is determined must be de-linked from the disability and neutrally defined 
so as to apply to all persons on an equal basis.’13  These interpretations are neither doctrinally nor 
practically satisfying.  In both cases, the provisions envisaged are likely to be applied 
disproportionately to people with disabilities, because of characteristics directly related to their 
disabilities.  It is unconvincing to draw a distinction between the disability and the characteristic of 
the disability, when the characteristic may be a core diagnostic criterion of the disability, and is 
certainly caused by the disability.  Insofar as the concern is that detention of people because of 
disability is discriminatory – a key concern of the CRPD – it is difficult to see that the problem has 
been solved:  instead, direct discrimination has merely become indirect discrimination.  It is difficult 
to see that this resolves anything.  Further, the interpretations emphasise a consistency with the 
existing approaches.  There is perhaps something of a sense that the problem is one of drafting, 
rather than of substance.  Insofar as this is the intent, it must be aggressively challenged.  As will be 
discussed below, the usual justifications for detention are themselves problematic, and require 
careful analysis.  In much of the world, including many Council of Europe countries, meaningful 
standards of detention do not in fact exist.  People with intellectual disabilities may for example be 
placed in institutions shortly after birth and remain institutionalised for all their lives.  This is not a 
drafting issue, but an issue of substantive human rights; and ‘business as usual’ should not be 
considered an option.  It remains to be seen how Article 14 if the CRPD will be interpreted; but it 
must be interpreted to provide real human rights protections for people with disabilities. 
 
The view that the CRPD does not allow for disability to be used as any part of the criteria for 
detention creates particular difficulties in counties governed by the ECHR.  Article 5 of the ECHR 
precludes deprivations of liberty, subject to certain exceptions, including as part of 5(1)(e), persons 
of unsound mind.  The ECHR therefore creates an exception on the very grounds that the CRPD 
                                                          
10
 See W Gardiner, C Lidz et al.  ‘Patients’ Revisions of Their Beliefs About the Need for Hospitalization’ (1999) 
156 American Journal of Psychiatry 1385; and W Gardner and C Lidz, ‘Gratitude and Coercion between 
Physicians and Patients (2001) 31 Psychiatric Annals 125. 
11
 C Katsakou et al.  ‘Treatment Satisfaction among Involuntary Patients’ (2010) 61 Psychiatric Services 286, 
290.  This study also finds that the relevant measure of coercion is the perceived coercion by the service user, 
not the formal legal mechanism, reminding us of the complex relationship between legal mechanisms and the 
experience of coercion. 
12
 See R Kayess and P French, ‘Out of darkness into light?  Introducing the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities’ *2008+ HRLR 1 at 21. 
13
Annual report of the High Commissioner for HumanRights to the General Assembly.  A/HRC/10/49, 
presented 26 January 2009, para 49.   
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would appear to prohibit.  It is difficult to see how the sort of ‘non-discriminatory’ criteria proposed 
by the UN High Commissioner could be instituted in Council of Europe countries, consistent with 
Article 5.  The conflict of laws here does not appear to have been recognised during the 
development of the CRPD, and it is not obvious how the tension between the two instruments will 
be resolved.   
 
While it must be acknowledged that CoE institutions are to implement CoE instruments, 
some cognisance of the CRPD and the developing jurisprudence of the CRPD Committee is 
necessary.  The EU and all CoE member states are also signatories of the CRPD, and at the very least, 
integration of requirements must be such that it is possible for parties to both conventions to fulfil 
their obligations under both conventions:  it is not acceptable that one system positively require 
states to do X, and the other system to prohibit states from doing X.  Even under the strongest 
readings of article 14 of the CRPD, this is not necessarily a problem for the ECHR, since article 5(1)(e) 
of the ECHR allows but does not require the detention of persons of unsound mind.  If this 
distinction is relied upon, it is possible that at least as regards detention of persons of unsound mind, 
5(1)(e) becomes a dead letter, with the detentions is permits precluded in practice by the CRPD.  
While this is a logically consistent result, it would lead to the result that the primary human rights 
instrument in Europe and the most important regional human rights instruments in the world would 
be silent on a fundamental area of human rights for people with disabilities.  This would be, at the 
very least, a surprising and disappointing result. 
 
However the CRPD is eventually interpreted, it is clear that much clearer justifications  will 
be required when people with mental disabilities are detained, if indeed such detention is permitted 
at all. It was argued above that the situation based on the Council of Europe institutions similarly 
argues for clearer articulations of detention criteria.  To this degree, the overall direction of travel of 
the two conventions is broadly similar, even if full integration of CRPD and ECHR approaches may 
prove problematic. 
 
While it will, in the end, be for individual States Party to determine the relevant legislation 
within their jurisdictions within the frameworks described above, a brief overview of the options and 
the potential pitfalls of those criteria may be of assistance. 
 
Criteria for Detention 
 
Status Approaches 
 
 Status approaches allow detention of individuals based on a condition of body or mind, for 
current purposes generally having an intellectual impairment, or a psychiatric diagnosis.  While 
detention under the Winterwerp criteria require clear evidence by a medical professional of such a 
condition prior to detention as a person of unsound mind under Article 5(1)(e), such a status is not 
meant to be a sufficient condition for detention.  As noted above, the condition is meant to be ‘of a 
kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement’- typically some combination of need for 
treatment, dangerousness to self or others, and mental incapacity.  As further noted above, 
however, while the Ministers’ Recommendation of 2004 includes a combination of these factors, 
along with requirements that the views of the individual be taken into account and that the 
admission is the least restrictive option available,14 domestic legislation often does not include these 
criteria.  Clearly, however, failure to include additional criteria such as those listed in the 2004 
recommendation cannot be considered Winterwerp compliant. 
 
                                                          
14
 CM(2004)97, Art 17. 
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 Even if legislation does include additional such as those contained in the 2004 
recommendation, it is not obvious how carefully the criteria are actually applied.  Systematic 
research as to the application of national criteria is relatively scarce, but anecdotal reports leave an 
impression there are some countries in the CoE where people are detained, either according to the 
law or de facto, often for long periods of time, where there has been no obvious reference to the 
additional criteria of the sort noted.  These impressions correspond to the anecdotal reports of 
practitioners and human rights activists in many CoE countries.  Insofar as this represents an 
accurate picture, the result is akin to the status approach, and ought to be of considerable concern 
to the human rights organisations in the CoE.  This would not constitute compliance with the ECHR 
jurisprudence, let alone CRPD standards. 
 
 The requirement in Winterwerp that a diagnosed mental illness is a condition precedent for 
detention under article 5(1)(e) raises the questions noted above regarding interface with the CRPD, 
insofar as Article 14 would appear to require the uncoupling of criteria of detention from disability.  
The criteria for detention discussed in the following sections of this paper, when they appear in the 
legislation of CoE states, include a requirement for a mental disorder to be present, consistent with 
the Winterwerp criteria.  As the CRPD may require us to move away from this criterion, the 
discussion that follows will consider both the application of the criteria when mental disorder is a 
further condition precedent to detention, and when it is not. 
 
Dangerousness to self or others 
 
 As noted above, the ECtHR has expressly stated that the detention of a dangerous person 
with mental disorder is justified under Article 5(1)(e).  Indeed, such justification is justified even if no 
effective treatment exists.15  In this it would seem to be in conflict with the 2004 Recommendation 
of Ministers, which would require both evidence of dangerousness and a therapeutic purpose (along 
with a requirement of least restrictive alternative, and consideration of the views of the potential 
detainee) prior to detention.16  The dangerousness requirement is contained, in some form or other, 
in many of the relevant domestic laws relating to detention of persons with mental disabilities. 
 
 It is a problematic approach, in that it re-enforces the myth that people with mental 
disabilities are dangerous, a highly stigmatising stereotype.  While studies (mainly in America) have 
shown that people with mental disabilities are slightly more dangerous than average, the difference 
is marginal; and the proportion of violence caused by people with mental disabilities is small.  It is 
also on its face discriminatory:  societies do not detain people based on their dangerousness in the 
future; instead, the individual is left at large until violence or other criminal behaviour actually 
occurs, at which point the state can intervene.  Particularly given the problems of prediction noted 
below, it is not obvious why detention of people with mental disabilities is not subject to the same 
approach. 
 
 ‘Dangerousness to self or others’ is frequently recited uncritically as a unified phrase, but the 
theoretical justifications for intervention to protect the self are quite different than to protect 
others.  The protection of self is largely a paternalist justification, where the protection of others is a 
part of the state’s policing role, ensuring public safety.  Given the state’s different interests in these 
categories, the approach to intervention should arguably be quite different.  In particular, it is fair to 
ask what the justification for intervention in the interests of protection of self is.  Certainly  if an 
individual understands the risks to himself or herself of remaining outside a psychiatric institution, it 
is fair to ask why he or she should not be allowed to run those risks.  If an individual is not able to 
                                                          
15
 Hutchison Reid v the United Kingdom, Application no. 50272/99, judgment of 20 May 2003, (2003) 37 EHRR 
9.  
16
 Rec(2004)10, recommendation 17(1). 
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understand, the argument may perhaps change; but that is a question of whether the individual has 
capacity, a subject that will be discussed further below.   
 
 It is not self-evident that it is a theoretically defensible requirement, at least insofar as it 
relies on prediction of dangerous behaviour rather than violent behaviour actually performed.  
Decisions based on the impressions of psychiatric professionals are roundly criticised as inaccurate, 
sometimes little better than chance. More formalised systems are often based on criteria such as 
race, sex, age, or social class.  These raise obvious human rights problems.  How would we defend a 
system where the decision to confine was based, even if only in part, on the basis that an individual 
was black, male, young or poor?  Such systems may also be quite accurate for classes of people, but 
problematic to apply in individual cases.  Thus we know that statistically, women are better drivers 
than men; but that does not necessarily tell us much about whether a given man is a better driver 
than a given woman.  Similarly, knowing the likelihood of dangerousness in a class of individuals 
defined by a variety of demographic variables does not necessarily tell us whether a given individual 
in that class will be dangerous or not.   
 
 Some tools for the assessment of dangerousness include consideration of the individual’s 
personal history.  While this has the advantage of moving the calculation out of the realm of broad 
demographic criteria into factors associated with the individual, it does not change the fact that the 
criteria are unchanging:  ones history, like ones race or sex, does not change over time.  It is 
therefore likely to be very difficult, once one has scored high enough on the dangerousness 
assessment to justify detention, ever to fall below that threshold:  there are too few variables that 
are open to change during the process of detention.  If these tools are relied upon, it may well be 
that the individual will be detained for a very long time. 
 
Some improvements have been made in predictions of dangerousness in the last decade or 
so, but they remain weak.  The MacArthur scale developed in the United States is the best available.  
They divide dangerousness into a five-point scale.  If detention were restricted to the most 
dangerous – people scoring 5 on the scale – one in eight people detained would not be violent in the 
following year, and only 27 per cent of the violence caused by people with mental disabilities would 
have been identified.  Including people scoring 4 on the scale would increase the percentage of 
violent people detained to 59, but 44 per cent of those scoring 4 would not go on to be dangerous, 
so that an increasingly large number of people would be detained who would not go on to be 
dangerous.  We would find these numbers unacceptable in the context of wrongful convictions and 
detentions of criminals; it is not obvious why they would become acceptable for people with mental 
disabilities. 
 
The MacArthur scale is the best predictor we currently have; but its authors acknowledge 
that it is too complex to be used in a clinical setting.  The tools for dangerousness prediction that can 
be used at this time are less accurate than the MacArthur scale, and the consequent numbers of 
false positives and false negatives for dangerous will in practice therefore be higher than those 
noted above.   
 
 Statutes adopting a dangerousness standard tend to be poorly drafted, leaving much to the 
discretion of admitting physicians and social services staff, and no clear criteria for the courts to use 
for subsequent assessment.  For this reason, it is worth citing the criteria in Ontario, Canada, which 
uses a dangerousness standard and does provide at least some measure of clarity: 
 
15(1)  Where a physician examines a person and has reasonable cause to believe that the 
person, 
 
c:\docume~1\uazjcw\locals~1\temp\strasbourg_detention_paper.doc Page 9 of 13 
31 August 2012 
(a) has threatened or attempted or is threatening or attempting to cause bodily harm to himself 
or herself; 
(b) has behaved or is behaving violently towards another person or has caused or is causing 
another person to fear bodily harm from him or her; or 
(c) has shown or is showing a lack of competence to care for himself or herself 
 
and if in addition the physician is of the opinion that the person is apparently suffering from 
mental disorder of a nature or quality that likely will result in, 
 
(d) serious bodily harm to the person; 
(e) serious bodily harm to another person; or 
(f) serious physical impairment of the person 
 
the physician may make application in the prescribed form for a psychiatric assessment of the 
person.17 
 
No doubt other criteria could be adopted, but the Ontario criteria do have the advantage of clear 
drafting. 
 
 As discussed above, it may be the case that the CRPD will require the uncoupling of 
detention from disability, but will allow some of the criteria traditionally used alongside disability to 
continue to justify so long as they are equally applied to people without disabilities.  In this context, 
the question would be whether dangerousness could be used as a criterion of detention generally, 
and not merely for people with disabilities.   
 
 In terms of the development of predictive tools, this might be possible.  As noted above, 
mental disability is not a particularly good predictor of dangerousness, so its removal from isometric 
tests would not necessarily undermine the predictive value of the test.  Further, comparable 
instruments are in use in parole and similar hearings for people without mental illness.  If we wish to 
lock up people on the basis of dangerousness simpliciter, that could presumably be done. 
 
 Whether it is desirable is of course a quite different question.  It is difficult to imagine that it 
will be politically attractive to the population as a whole, a significant number of whom may find 
themselves falling under the demographic variables or personal history variables that predict future 
dangerousness, and the number of false positives (ie., people showing up as dangerous on the 
instrument when they would not actually be violent in fact) would be likely to prove highly 
contentious. 
 
 Such objections are important, but they raise a different question:  these are precisely the 
difficulties that exist already when this test is applied to people with mental disabilities.  It is fair to 
wonder why they would be unacceptable if imposed on the population as a whole, but are 
considered acceptable if imposed on the community of people with mental disabilities.  Is there an 
answer other than discrimination? 
 
Need for Treatment 
 
 Psychiatric hospitals are considered to be places of medical treatment, and the availability of 
treatment is used as a criterion for detention in both the 2004 CoE Recommendation18 and some 
domestic legislation.19   
                                                          
17
 RSO 1990, c M-7. 
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Certainly, it may make sense that the availability of treatment is used as a part of mental 
health legislation, and may be helpful in determining, for example, where an individual who has 
become subject to detention should be detained, although whether the individual ought to be 
subject to compulsory treatment is a different set of questions, considered in another paper in this 
collection, and whether it makes sense to admit the individual to a psychiatric hospital in the event 
that he or she will refuse the relevant treatment is at best doubtful. 
 
Using the need for treatment as a criterion of detention, and particularly as the primary 
criterion of detention, is much more problematic.  Certainly, after Winterwerp, it is not any mental 
disorder that will justify detention, but only one that warrants detention (implying, no doubt 
correctly, that some mental disorders do not warrant detention).  This suggests that for purposes of 
detention, there must be a serious disorder, for which an appropriate and effective treatment is 
available.  Drawing criteria around these factors will be nigh on impossible.  How serious is serious?  
How effective is effective?  It is difficult to see how a meaningful drafting standard can be reached 
for these issues.20 
 
The question of discrimination also arises once again.  Societies do not generally detain 
people for treatment, except for people with mental disabilities.  Why would this distinction be 
justified, particularly in the event that the individual understands the proposed treatment and does 
not want it?   
 
In the context of the CRPD, the question of indirect discrimination seems particularly 
problematic here.  If the CRPD is meant to require the uncoupling of disability from detention, it is 
difficult to see that a detention criterion that refers to the need for treatment can stand.   The 
treatment by definition will be treatment for the mental disability that affects the detainee.  To 
claim that one is not detaining on the basis of disability but instead for ‘health’ or ‘treatment’, when 
the treatment is for the disability in question is pure sophistry. 
 
 
Capacity 
 
 In recent times, arguments have been made to base psychiatric and related detention on the 
capacity of individuals:  if they lack the capacity to decide admission, they may in at least some 
circumstances be admitted under compulsion; if they do not, they may only be admitted with their 
agreement.21  In much of western Europe, North America and Australasia, capacity has in recent 
years been seen as a progressive way forward in regulation of mental disability, at least partly 
because it was perceived as non-discriminatory:  societies do compel people without capacity, 
whatever the reason for that lack of capacity; it is therefore non-discriminatory to use it as a 
standard of compulsion for people with mental disabilities.  Consistent with this, some of the 
academic literature relating to capacity-based detention laws argue that if the individual lacks 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
18
 Rec(2004)10, recommendation 17(1)(iii). 
19
 See, eg., Mental Health Act 1983, s 3(2)(d) [England and Wales], as amended 2007. 
20
 For a discussion of these issues in the related context of compulsory treatment, see P Bartlett, ‘The 
Necessity must be convincingly shown to exist:  Standards for compulsory treatment for mental disorder under 
the Mental Health Act 1983’, forthcoming Medical Law Review (2011), doi:10.1093/medlaw/fwr025.   This 
paper is/will be available on open access. 
21
 See J Dawson and G Szmukler, ‘Fusion of mental health and incapacity legislation’, 188 British Journal of 
Psychiatry (2006) 504.  Capacity forms part of the admission criteria in both Scotland (see Mental Health (Care 
and Treatment) Act (Scotland) 2003, 2003 asp 13, s. 36(4)(b)) and France (Loi no 90-527 du 27 juin 1990, 
Art.L.333), although both these statutes have additional requirements prior to detention. 
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capacity, the decision to admit should not be automatic, but should reflect the decision the 
individual would have made had he or she had capacity.  The Scots and French legislation that relies 
in part upon capacity does not use this approach, but does include other safeguards as to the 
severity of the mental disorder before an individual is admitted compulsorily. 
 
 Capacity must nonetheless be approached with considerable caution.  The usual articulation 
of capacity includes not merely requirements that the individual be able to understand the 
information relevant to a decision, but also that he or she appreciate the consequences of making 
the decision in question.  This last criterion is remarkably flexible, and has led to allegations that 
capacity means agreeing with the psychiatrist.22  While there is some evidence that the test may be 
administrable with reasonable consistency,23 there does not appear to be a large-scale trial of this 
question.  Similarly, while the one study of service user views of decisions based on show a 
remarkable retrospective approval rating in England,24 the sample size of the study is small – only 35 
patients – and it remains to be seen whether this finding can be generalised. 
 
 Concerns regarding the capacity test further flow from the fact that, implicitly, it is the test 
used in the detention of large numbers of persons with learning disability in central Europe.  The 
result is the long-term detention of people in children’s institutions, social care homes and similar 
institutions for long periods of time.  The reasons for this are various.  In part, they flow from an 
ossified conception of capacity, where capacity is largely conflated with the presence of the mental 
disability:  there often appears to be little or no meaningful determination of whether an individual 
actually has capacity, once the existence of a learning disability or, often, mental health difficulty is 
identified.  Further, there appears to be no concept of decision-specific capacity determination:  a 
decision that an individual lacks capacity affects their entire life, depriving them of all decision-
making authority.  Finally, there appears to be no tradition of making the decision that the individual 
lacking capacity would have made if competent, although this set of questions quickly collapses into 
the issue of the choices that are available on the day:  in countries where there is little if any 
community-based supported accommodation for people with mental disabilities, the determination 
that institutionalisation is in the ‘best interests’ of the individual appears a foregone, if macabre, 
conclusion. 
 
 If there is any thought to using an improved conception of capacity as a detention criterion 
in these countries, serious thought will need to be given to questions of implementation.  This will 
be pivotal whatever criteria are adopted, of course, but it is a particular concern in the event that 
incapacity is chosen.  The language of incapacity already has a substantial history in these countries, 
and absent considerable work in re-orienting the workforce, significant change is unlikely to occur.   
 
 Capacity raises particular difficulties under the CRPD.  Article 12(2) specifically provides that 
individuals have the right to ‘enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life.’  
Under some interpretations, this means that individuals never in law lose capacity.  If this 
interpretation is adopted, capacity-based detention criteria would be in violation of the Convention.  
Even if Article 12 is given a more flexible interpretation, the same problem regarding uncoupling of 
disability from detention under Article 14 arises as has been noted previously:  it is difficult to see 
that the incapacity can sensibly be separated from the mental disability, given that it is the mental 
                                                          
22
 For a critical analysis of capacity as a criterion for psychiatric detention, see P Bartlett, ‘The Test of 
Compulsion in Mental Health Law: Capacity, Therapeutic Benefit and Dangerousness as Possible Criteria’ 
(2003) 11 Med L Rev 326. 
23
 R Cairns and others, ‘Reliability of Mental Capacity Assessments in Psychiatric In-patients’ (2005) 187 Br J 
Psychiatry 372. 
24
 G Owen and others, ‘Retrospective Views of Psychiatric In-patients Regaining Mental Capacity’ (2009) 195 Br 
J Psychiatry 403. 
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disability that is the direct cause of the incapacity.  Insofar as the use of the disability as a criterion is 
discriminatory, therefore, the use of incapacity as a detention criterion therefore merely moves 
direct discrimination into indirect discrimination. 
 
 Here, as in all the detention criteria, the question remains as to the degree to which the use 
of mental disability is a discriminatory criterion in detentions and other compulsory interventions, 
reviving the question of whether the social model really can answer all issues relating to mental 
disability.  People with mental disabilities living in the community may well be extremely vulnerable.  
While, consistent with the social model of disability, it is certainly appropriate to regulate the 
remainder of society to ensure that these people are not taken advantage of, it is fair to wonder 
whether there are at least some limits to such interventions.  In the event that the individual is 
manifestly lacking capacity, for example, and unable to organise basic care for themselves, it is fair 
to wonder whether it is justifiable to introduce that basic care even if some form of compulsion is 
required.  This is not to say that institutionalisation should be permitted uncritically in these 
circumstances (although some would argue that sufficient intrusion may sometimes be necessary to 
a degree that would constitute a deprivation of liberty under ECHR article 5 and thus, presumably, 
CRPD article 14), but it is to say that society may not need simply to let the individual rot in these 
circumstances.  Indeed, intervention may perhaps be required under the CRPD’s provisions 
regarding protection from exploitation, violence and abuse (art 16).  The presence of incapacity 
seems relevant here: people with disabilities who are capable of making their own decisions should 
presumably be left to do so in these circumstances.  When the individual lacks capacity, the issues 
are not so clear.  It is unclear how the tensions between these articles and article 12’s right to the 
enjoyment of capacity will be worked through. 
 
Least Restrictive Alternative 
 
 Consistent with much of the academic literature, the 2004 recommendation states that 
detention should be pursued only if it is the least restrictive alternative available.25  While this is 
unobjectionable (and indeed highly desirable), it begs questions as to how the least restrictive 
alternative is to be considered.  Its context in the 2004 recommendation suggests that it is the 
alternatives available on the day that are at issue.  In many central European countries, however, the 
only option available on the day may be institutionalisation, since there is little if any supported 
community housing available, and little additional funding to families to provide home care for their 
loved ones.  The effect of focussing only on the options available on the day is that it creates no 
impetus for change:  on the day, noninstitutional options will not be available ever, unless pressure 
is placed on governments to develop those services.  In this sense, in much of Europe, least 
restrictive alternative is not actually a very meaningful concept, as it is currently construed.  At the 
same time, as discussed in the introduction to this paper, it is vital to the understanding of article 3, 
since force on a detainee beyond that which is necessary raises the prospect of an Article 3 violation.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 However the CRPD is interpreted, it must be the case that much more clarity and 
transparency of justification will be required for detentions of people with mental disabilities in the 
future, if such detentions are permitted at all.  Given the intrusiveness and dehumanizing effects of 
many institutions, issues do arise under Article 3, in particular for those people who are not 
appropriately admitted to the institution.  It is therefore appropriate that the CoE institutions, 
including the CPT, press for considerably enhanced statutory governance of admissions to 
psychiatric hospitals, social care homes, and similar institutions, and it is appropriate given the 
                                                          
25
 Rec(2004)10, rec 17(1)(iv). 
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vulnerabilities of the populations in question that the CPT make reasonable efforts to take into 
consideration the implementation of the laws.   
